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Hallvard Lillehammer 
 
Introduction 
 
 
My mother once told me that we choose our parents. At first I had no idea what she was 
talking about. It briefly occurred to me that she was giving expression to some kind of 
hippy existentialism. Later on I began to think she had a point. In this chapter I attempt to 
articulate what that point might have been. In doing so my aim is to give an interpretation 
of my mother’s remark according to which it articulates an ethically significant insight. I 
will try to make sense of the idea that, in suitable conditions, making the kind of choices 
my mother was talking about can be both conducive to wellbeing and a genuinely 
virtuous achievement. I will describe how this achievement relates to some controversial 
questions about the responsibilities that parents are sometimes said to have to inform 
their children about their genealogical origins. By ‘genealogical origins’ I mean to 
include facts about the nature of our conception, gestation or birth, as well as features of 
our familial history, such as facts about step-parenting, adoption, extramarital 
relationships and the like.. More narrowly, I hope to throw light on some of the ethical 
challenges involved in creating or bringing up children who are in some way estranged, 
or otherwise detached, from one or more of their biological parents. By ‘biological 
parents’ I mean to include (apart from parents reproducing in ‘conventional’ ways) 
persons providing gametes, persons providing embryos, and persons carrying a 
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pregnancy on behalf of someone else during the course of assisted reproduction. The 
class of such children includes some children born as the result of assisted conception. It 
also includes adopted children, children with one or more missing parents (including 
orphans), conventionally conceived children one of whose social parents is not their 
biological parent, and others. The exact process by means of which the children in 
question are brought into existence, such as whether gamete or embryo donation was 
involved, is not crucial to my main concern here. What is crucial to my main concern is 
the potential for estrangement or detachment that the process in question creates, and the 
ethical significance of that potential. 
 
Like millions of children of her generation, born either during or in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, my mother grew up with an absent father. In her 
case, the identity of the father was known, and some forms of communication between 
father and child were possible (exchanges of letters, gifts, etc.). Yet there was no prospect 
of any direct personal contact between father and child, and the amount and kind of 
information passed on to my mother about her father’s identity and circumstances were 
severely affected by the complexity of post-war European political demographics and 
historical memory. At one point in my mother’s early adulthood, written communication 
between father and daughter flared up, and then came to an end. From that point onwards, 
questions about her father’s identity or circumstances seem to have played at most a 
peripheral role in my mother’s life, except for isolated episodes, mainly in response to the 
curiosity of her own children. Until the death of my grandmother in the late 1990’s, 
questions about my mother’s genealogical origins on her father’s side seem to have been 
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of little importance to her conception of who she was, or to how she would present 
herself to others as a daughter, wife, mother, friend or member of her community. So 
exactly what, given these constraining facts about her own familial circumstances, did 
she mean when she said that we choose our parents? In the next section I sketch one 
possible answer to that question. In the following sections, I then consider two lines of 
argument for the claim that the kind of choice my mother was talking about is one it is 
always wrong for someone to wilfully impose on another in the presence of ethically 
acceptable alternatives (which in her case, I assume, did not exist).  
 
Choice and identity 
 
On one standard interpretation, what my mother said about choosing our parents is 
obviously false. Normally, we do not choose our parents. Never in the biological sense, 
and in a social sense in particular circumstances only, such as in certain divorce 
proceedings, or in other situations involving the possibility of shared or alternative 
parenting. In any case, the kind of dependency experienced by children with respect to 
their parents, at least in the early years of life, is such that there is very limited scope for 
their exercise of any meaningful choice for or against specific parental relationships. So 
what could my mother possibly have been on about? 
 
Making a choice trivially implies the existence of more than one option. Making a choice 
voluntarily is often said to require at least one alternative option to be in some sense (e.g. 
morally or prudentially) acceptable (c.f. Olsaretti, 2004). Yet saying this leaves much 
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unspecified about the nature and ethics of making choices. There are many different 
circumstances in which someone might be said to choose something, either voluntarily or 
non-voluntarily. In one kind of case, someone could be said to choose something if they 
have the option to decide between that thing and another thing of the same kind. Suppose 
I am travelling by plane to a philosophy conference on assisted reproduction. During the 
flight, I might be presented with the choice of an in-flight meal and choose between 
chicken or beef. Alternatively, I might be presented with a choice between either taking 
or not taking something. Thus, I might be presented with the choice of either accepting 
the one in-flight meal on offer or not having an in-flight meal at all. Obviously, these two 
scenarios do not exhaust the possibilities. On some airlines you can decline both the 
chicken and the beef and request a vegetarian option instead. Other passengers prefer to 
bring their own food on board, as often seen on low cost carriers. Some very keen 
passengers may even take their chances and ask for chicken and beef. Then there are 
different kinds of choice exercised with respect to the same option. Suppose only beef is 
on offer. Still, the beef could come with a salad, a piece of bread and some cheese, and a 
glass of juice or water. Or perhaps you are able to combine parts of the hot meal served at 
one point in the flight with parts of the cold meal offered at another point. In each case, 
and for a wider or narrower range of options, you would have the opportunity to make a 
voluntary choice, and thereby exercise your agency in more or less successful or 
admirable ways. 
 
On one way of interpreting my mother’s remark, what she was bringing to my attention 
was that working out one’s relationship to one’s parents is a long term creative process 
 5 
that involves a complex exercise of agency, and in the course of which a wide range of 
ethically significant choices will be made about the nature of that relationship, even in 
circumstances (such as those she experienced) where the range of options on offer is 
severely constrained. Thus, a relationship to one’s parents is one that could develop in 
such a way as to become more or less detached, either physically or psychologically. And 
these days it is possible to have a close personal relationship to one’s parents even though 
you live permanently on the other side of the world. As a child, many of the aspects of 
that relationship are in the parents’ gift. Yet at some point, many of us find ourselves in a 
position of having to choose where to live in relation to our parents, how and how often 
to see or communicate with them, who of them to see more often, and whether, and if so 
how, to involve them in our own domestic affairs. Children exercise such choices in 
meaningful ways insofar as they might have some say about whether they mostly play 
inside the home with their parents present or absent, outside the home with other 
children, in a club, in the home of other children, or with other relatives; and so on. In my 
mother’s case, these choices were severely constrained in at least one important respect. 
Yet it is a notable feature of her relationship to her father that she does not appear to have 
found these limitations either deeply problematic or constraining. Nor does her eventual 
decision to terminate contact seem to have been experienced as a grave loss, at least by 
her. I have no reason to believe that my mother’s experience is either special or unique in 
this respect. 
 
I say that a person’s conception of him or herself as a certain kind of individual is a 
conception of themselves as having a certain kind of ‘practical identity’; an identity they 
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may or may not think of themselves as sharing with others to whom they consider 
themselves to be closely related in some way (as when someone identifies themselves as 
a certain kind of person, or as a member of a team (c.f. Korsgaard, 1995). To form a 
conception of oneself in relation to one’s parents involves a complex exercise of agency 
in the course of which a person develops a practical identity that is informed both by their 
beliefs about what that relationship is and what it ought to be. To that extent, it inevitably 
involves a range of ethically sensitive choices, even if the options for relating to one or 
more of one’s parents are severely restricted by facts beyond one’s control. One kind of 
person to become is a person who self-identifies as a person from a two-parent family, 
where both social parents are also assumed to be one’s biological parents. Yet another 
kind of person to become is a person who self-identifies as a person from a single parent 
family, a family with an absent father, or a family where there is no social relationship 
with one or more of one’s biological parents, for example in cases of anonymous sperm 
or egg donation. Making the kinds of choices that are necessary to form and sustain such 
a practical identity can obviously be done more or less successfully or admirably. In 
particular, choosing (or choosing away) a certain kind of relationship with one or more of 
one’s parents can have significant effects on the level of someone’s wellbeing, and can in 
some cases amount to a virtuous achievement, and one that need not be purchased at the 
cost of either ignorance or self-deception. It is in this sense that I think my mother was 
right to say that we choose our parents, and that in saying so she was giving expression to 
an ethically significant insight.  
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Identity, knowledge and virtue 
 
No reasonable person would seriously deny that someone could respond in the most 
admirable ways to having a severely restricted range of options. Even so, there are 
situations in which so responding is at best a virtue of necessity, and in which we might 
consider it better if the person in question would never have had to exercise the relevant 
choices in the first place. The fact that children can grow up to live well and form 
ethically admirable, good, or otherwise satisfactory relationships to one or more of their 
parents in a range of difficult circumstances (regardless of whether or not these 
circumstances involve non-conventional methods of conception or gestation) does not 
imply that it is therefore either admirable, good or even permissible to deliberately place 
them in those difficult circumstances. There is more than one line of argument that might 
be thought to put the enforced detachment of children from core aspects of their 
genealogical origins into ethical doubt. Here I shall consider two. The first relates to the 
place of self-understanding in our formation of a virtuous practical identity. The second 
relates to the fact that certain forms of adaptive preference formation can be a symptom 
of one person having been wronged by others. Before I address these lines of argument, 
however, I shall briefly explain the notions of a ‘virtue’ and a ‘virtuous achievement’ on 
which my discussion depends (c.f. Hursthouse, 2012). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I say that a ‘virtue’ is an admirable character trait, and a 
‘virtuous achievement’ its successful manifestation or exercise, where by ‘successful’ I 
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mean ‘actually successful’, not just ‘successful as things appear to its subject’ (more of 
which below). Thus, you might admire someone for their honesty (a virtue), especially in 
a situation where telling the truth was a difficult thing to do (a virtuous achievement).  
Some people think that possession of virtue to a very high degree is necessary to live a 
good life. I do not make that claim. What I do claim, though, is that virtue can enhance a 
good life, such that living well and being virtuous constitutes one of the greatest 
excellences of which human lives are capable. Furthermore, even if trade offs are 
sometimes possible or even necessary, the aim to live well while also being virtuous is 
itself a distinctively admirable one. If I tell you that I dream of a good and virtuous life, I 
do not expect to have to give you any explanation or excuse.  
 
What personal features does a good and virtuous life require? For present purposes, the 
main feature that matters is self-knowledge. If you have poor knowledge of yourself, you 
could be less likely to live well, or to develop what you yourself would consider an 
admirable character. Indeed, it is natural to think that a highly virtuous person is a person 
who knows him or herself unusually well, and for whom disclosure of further facts about 
themselves would not subvert their general sense of who they are and what they ought to 
be. Some of these facts will be intrinsic to that person, such as how they look and feel. 
Other facts will be relational facts, such as how that person is related to the people around 
them, or to past events affecting the choices they have to make about the course of their 
life. There are several ways in which such facts are said to affect the way someone’s life 
is going and the extent to which it makes sense to admire them. One way is for those 
facts to be significant in themselves (e.g. the fact that you are a human person). Another 
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way is for those facts to be significant in virtue of the person investing them with 
significance, as when you decide to pursue a certain project. A third way is for those facts 
to be accorded significance by others, for instance the fact that you are a suitable 
candidate for being invited to participate in another person’s project. In each case, there is 
both a first person and a third person perspective one might take on the evaluative 
significance of those facts - perspectives that will often come apart (c.f. Griffin, 1986; 
Feldman, 2004). Thus, I might think I have gained acceptance as a member of a circle of 
friends with whom I personally identify, but actually have failed to do so because the 
other members of the circle do not in fact identify with me. It is a controversial question 
to what extent I can be said to be doing very well in this kind of case. Alternatively, I 
might proudly represent myself in public as an exemplary embodiment of admirable 
personal features, the possession of which is known to be a necessary condition for 
admittance to a club of which I am a member, whereas in fact an exception was made in 
my case and the people who admitted me are sworn to secrecy about the compromising 
terms of my admission. It is a controversial question to what extent my proud displays 
can be said to be an admirable expression of the features in question in this kind of case 
(even if I have actually acquired those features in the interim). The issue is partly a matter 
of how the attitudes and behaviour of others, including their possession and application of 
knowledge about me, affects our third personal evaluation of the significance of my 
behaviour. The suggestion is not that in every instance where someone is kept in the dark, 
or where other people mislead us about some aspect of our lives, it is impossible for us to 
live either well or admirably. Who ever lived a life without being subject to some form of 
deception with regard to certain facts about their life or character? The suggestion is that 
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sometimes, when facts about someone that are unknown to them are handled by other 
people in ways that create a serious mismatch between what they take themselves to be 
and what they actually are, this can be a genuine obstacle to their efforts to live either 
well, or admirably, or both. 
 
Knowing who you are 
 
At some point in our life, at least some of us ask ourselves who we are, and who we want 
to be. Both questions involve a factual as well as an ethical component. Who I am is in 
part a function of my past and present circumstances, and is partly determined by others. 
It is also a function of what I do in response to those circumstances, both with respect to 
my actions and with respect to my conception of who I am. In particular, some of my 
actions, including those by means of which I come to define myself as a certain kind of 
person, will partly be based on developing a self-conception, and therefore on who I take 
myself to be.  
 
What do I need to know about myself in order to truly understand who I am in such a 
way as to live well or virtuously? On one view, known as ‘origin essentialism’, my 
numerical identity, as the unique individual that I am, is determined by my causal and, 
most importantly, my genetic origins (c.f. Parfit, 1984; Nagel, 1991). On this view, if 
someone had been conceived just before or just after me; or been differently constituted 
genetically through conception and gestation, that person would not have been me. It 
follows that unless I know the basic facts about my genealogical origins (including the 
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basic facts about my conception and gestation), I literally don’t know who I am, in the 
sense of being one particular distinguishable individual. 
 
Even if we are convinced by origin essentialism as a correct account of numerical 
identity, as in being one identifiable individual rather than another, it does not follow that 
the facts determining my numerical identity are sufficient to determine my practical 
identity, as in being (and self-identifying as being) a human individual with some 
distinguishing features rather than others. There are many things that could make more of 
a difference to who I think of myself as being than the facts that determine how I was 
constituted as the biological entity that I am. These include features of the social 
environment into which I am born. They also include ways in which I can mould myself 
to form certain characteristics in light of what I consider to be good or admirable. Yet 
even if we do not consider facts about numerical identity to determine facts about 
practical identity, it could still be reasonable to take an interest in facts about our 
genealogical origins in our construction of a practical identity. First, some of our physical 
and other medically relevant characteristics are inherited via our biological parents. 
Second, some physical and psychological characteristics are inherited via our biological 
parents and may find expression even if we do not grow up among those parents. In each 
case, these inherited features may affect the way other people behave towards us 
regardless of how we relate to those characteristics ourselves. Third, many people 
identify with their genealogical origins beyond merely taking an interest in physical and 
psychological similarities and medical statistics, and to the point of giving facts about 
those origins a pivotal role in the construction of their practical identity. Indeed, many of 
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us live in cultural circumstances where facts about our genealogy form a central part of 
widely shared practices of mutual recognition, solidarity and respect. Of course, our 
interest in facts of genealogy may vary according to circumstances. Thus, it is probably 
more pleasing to learn that one’s ancestors performed impressive or heroic acts of 
achievement and sacrifice than to learn that they were engaged in acts of non-
discriminate brutality. Yet regardless of what we may or may not feel about these facts 
ourselves, the way other people feel about them can sometimes have a decisive influence 
both on our ability to live well, and on our capacity to achieve certain forms of virtue.  
 
Clearly, some facts about a person’s genealogical origins (such as the identity of their 
social parents) can be more central to someone’s conception of themselves than others 
(such as the identity of distant biological relatives). Even so, there is some plausibility to 
the idea that the more about those origins one knows, the more about one’s place in the 
world one is able to understand. This thought naturally gives rise to the following 
argument. Virtuous agency requires the construction of a virtuous practical identity. The 
construction of a virtuous practical identity requires accurate self-knowledge. Accurate 
self-knowledge requires knowledge about one’s genealogical origins. All else equal, the 
more extensive knowledge about one’s genealogical origins one has, the better placed 
one will be to construct a virtuous practical identity. Therefore, to deliberately prevent 
someone from acquiring accurate knowledge of their genealogical origins will harm their 
chances of constructing a virtuous practical identity. To that extent, it is wrong for 
parents to curtail their children’s access to facts about their genealogical origins. The 
wrong in question might in principle be outweighed by facts of the particular case that 
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make the communication of such facts either difficult, impossible, or otherwise to the 
detriment of the child in question. And the inability to form a genuinely virtuous practical 
identity need not detract from someone’s ability to live well. Yet the fact that this 
possibility could be realised in any particular case does not detract from the fact of its 
wrongness, at least other things being equal (c.f. Velleman, 2008). 
 
This argument rests on a number of questionable assumptions (some of them descriptive, 
some of them ethical). Even so, I think it would be a mistake to dismiss it without 
qualification. It would be both dogmatic and unreasonable to flatly deny that knowledge 
of one’s genealogical origins can be valuable, and therefore that to prevent someone from 
acquiring such knowledge is to burden them with a potentially significant loss. Why, for 
example, should children growing up in families where one or more of their biological 
parents is absent or unknown be uniquely excluded from developing a conception of 
themselves that is based on a truthful account of their genealogical origins, as in cases of 
anonymous egg or sperm donation? Even so, the argument is faced with a number or 
difficulties which together cast doubt on the idea that detachment from knowledge about 
one’s genealogical origins (whether by acquaintance or by description) is necessarily 
harmful to the development of a virtuous practical identity. 
 
First, just like it is not necessarily better in general for me to know more about something  
than to know less about it, so it is not necessarily better for me to know more rather than 
less about some aspect of my genealogical origins. Facts about those origins can be 
depressing, confusing, disruptive, distracting, or simply boring. Perhaps I have exactly 
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seven ancestors named ‘Paul’. So what? With respect to children, like my mother, who 
grow up in the absence of one or more of their biological parents, the extent to which 
accurate genealogical knowledge would either enhance or detract from their chances of 
successfully developing a virtuous practical identity is a context sensitive matter. 
Furthermore, the potential for harm does not come only from one direction. The ethical 
flipside of a potentially harmful ignorance of one’s genealogical origins is a potential 
harmful insistence in a genealogically obsessive culture that everyone should take an 
active interest in those origins. To enforce such an interest on everyone regardless of their 
contingent inclinations and circumstances could be both oppressive and, in cases where it 
is likely to be a cause of exclusion or stigmatization, potentially cruel.  
 
Second, we don’t care about our origins in every possible way. I might identify more 
with one of my parents than with the other; with my friends more than with my cousins; 
with a cause more than with my country; with my job more than with my gender. If so, I 
will partly detach myself from certain aspects of ‘who I am’ in order to cultivate the 
practical identity of someone with a multiplicity of overlapping social identities, at least 
some of which could be of greater significance to me than even basic facts about my 
genealogical origins. One possibility (and the one apparently realized by my mother) is to 
develop a practical identity in full consciousness of its ‘gappiness’ with respect to certain 
core facts about one’s genealogical origins, as someone who does not care (or does not 
care very much) about certain facts about the exact nature of their biological lineage. To 
put it differently: one type of person that you can become is someone who does not care 
(or care that much) where you come from; who your biological parents are; the 
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hometown of your paternal grandparents; that you are one of your biological father’s five 
hundred donor children; or whether you were biologically constituted by a mixture of 
leftovers on a dish. That someone could decide to become such a person, and could do so 
admirably, is indicated by the case of the millions of people (like my mother) whose 
detachment from some aspect of their biological inheritance has been forced upon them 
by circumstances beyond their control (such as death, adoption, gamete or embryo 
donation or having one or more absent parents). To this extent, cultivating an attitude of 
indifference towards even core aspects of one’s genealogical origins can constitute an 
exercise of virtue. Thus, even if we were to think of the value of self-understanding as 
some kind of ethical ‘master-value’ (or even as a ‘constitutive aim of action’), it would 
not follow that the kind of self-understanding that prioritises knowledge of one’s 
genealogical origins must be thought of as either the only genuine, or the most valuable, 
form of self-understanding that someone could virtuously cultivate. Another option, and 
one that could in principle be equally admirable, is one in which other attachments 
provide the primary resources for the construction of a virtuous practical identity. The 
cultivation of a practical identity in conditions of substantial detachment from core facts 
about one’s genealogical origins is therefore in principle consistent both with genuine 
virtue and with the kind of self-understanding on which virtue depends. One kind of 
person I can truly know myself as being is the kind of person who does not care (or does 
not care very much) about those things. 
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Not knowing who you are 
 
In order for someone to decline something, that thing had better be on offer. It is one 
thing to develop a virtuous practical identity in conditions where facts about one’s 
genealogical origins play little or no role in the context of being aware that there are 
significant gaps in one’s knowledge of those facts. It is quite another to develop such an 
identity in the false belief that one’s knowledge of those origins is accurate or complete. 
The response to the line of argument considered in the previous section presupposes that 
the person whose practical identity is in question is aware of the epistemic limitations of 
their situation in a way that is not the case for many children who grow up in a state of 
detachment from their genealogical origins, and for whom the decision scenario 
described in the previous section is therefore not relevant in a first personal way. It 
therefore does not follow from the arguments of the previous section that there are no 
residual obstacles to the decision on the part of someone’s parents to either protect or 
exclude their children from knowledge of basic facts about their genealogical origins. All 
that follows from the argument of the previous section is that there are no such obstacles 
in principle (at least with respect to self-understanding) in cases where the epistemic 
limitations in question are known to the persons themselves. So what, if anything, can be 
said about cases where this condition fails to be met?  
 
One response that is clearly inadequate is to appeal to the obvious fact that all children 
face the task of constructing a practical identity in conditions where some facts about 
their genealogical origins are unknown to them. This response fails to address the main 
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issue for two reasons. First, and as already noted, some facts about our genealogical 
origins are likely to make a much bigger difference to our self-understanding than others 
(even if what facts these are will vary from person to person). Second, there is an 
ethically relevant difference between someone else deciding what it is crucial for you to 
know about yourself and making that decision for yourself. Children who grow up in the 
absence of one or more of their biological parents, including some children born as a 
result of donor conception, are often put in that situation by someone else. How should 
we ethically describe the scenario in which someone places another person in conditions 
where they are either kept in the dark about core facts about their genealogical origins, or 
are actively prevented by others from escaping that ignorance? Answering that question 
gives rise to a further line of argument against the claim that living in ignorance of core 
facts about one’s genealogical origins is compatible with the successful development of a 
virtuous practical identity. 
 
There is a distinctive kind of wrong that is associated with the detachment of its victims 
from their real interests in the service of the interests of others. In the domain of politics 
this kind of wrong is sometimes described in terms of the idea of ‘false consciousness’: 
or the lived experience of someone who may think they are successfully pursuing their 
genuine interests, whereas in fact their condition is primarily serving the interests of 
others, interests whose satisfaction depends on other people being substantially detached 
from their own (c.f. Geuss, 1989). Thus, a member of the contemporary working class 
could take pride in their pursuit of affordable designer sports wear and the latest 
generation of smart phones, never seriously considering the possibility that it is exactly 
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by having their attention focused on the accumulation of trivial consumer goods that their 
labour and acquiescence can be effectively mobilised in the interests of the power and 
privilege of the economically and politically dominant super-rich. In a similar way, 
women who express contentment at radically asymmetric power relations between the 
sexes are sometimes described as suffering from false consciousness in virtue of having 
been forcibly detached from developing an adequate grasp of what is essentially an 
oppressive and exploitative relationship between men and women.  
 
There are at least two sorts of case of this kind of direct relevance to the present topic. On 
the one hand, there is the case of someone who is detached from their real interests in 
virtue of having cultivated a conception of their interests to accord with the options 
actually available to them, where this does not involve them being ignorant of any 
relevant fact, but is compatible with them being consciously aware of the way in which 
their choices are effectively constrained. Consider a prisoner who adjusts his routine to 
prison life in order to survive a long term of incarceration, or a victim of dictatorship who 
adjusts their ambitions to take account of the fact that they are living in a police state. On 
the other hand, there is the case of someone who is detached from their real interests in 
virtue of having been kept ignorant of some facts their ignorance of which is the cause of 
their failure to pursue those real interests. Consider someone who is fully devoted to 
construct a pleasant living environment within a prison compound, without ever paying 
any serious thought to the fact that their actions would be forcibly prevented should they 
try to leave. Instances of either kind could be described as cases of ‘adaptive preference 
formation’. Adaptive preference formation in cases where the pursuit of one’s ‘real’ 
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interests have been put out of bounds by others in a way that is either easily avoidable or 
unnecessary is a widely recognized form of unjust servitude. Of course, not all forms of 
adaptive preference formation are ethically problematic in this way. Thus, even though 
changing my route through the mountains because of the weather or altering my vast 
weekly intake of alcohol to reduce my health insurance premium could both be extremely 
unwelcome and seriously inconvenient from my first personal point of view, I would not 
thereby consider myself to be a victim of any kind of wrongdoing on that account. 
Indeed, one of the basic marks of knowing right from wrong is the ability to distinguish 
the obstacles to possible action that do, from those that do not, constitute unjustified 
interference with our pursuit of our real interests. 
 
It might be argued that even though the development of a practical identity in full 
awareness of the restricted potential for knowledge of one’s genealogical origins could be 
a non-malignant form of adaptive preference formation, the cultivation of a practical 
identity by someone who is deliberately kept ignorant of core facts about their 
genealogical origins would be a case of false, if contented, consciousness; at least in 
cases where the ignorance in question would have a seriously detrimental effect on their 
ability to live well compatibly with having true beliefs about themselves. One case of this 
kind of relevance to the ethics of assisted reproduction would be that of a donor 
conceived child whose personal sense of self-worth is for some reason conditional on a 
false belief about their inheritance of certain physical traits from one or more of their 
social parents. 
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There are at least four ethically significant analogies between the formation of a practical 
identity in a state of imposed ignorance about one’s genealogical origins and a state of 
false consciousness as I have defined it here. When taken together, these analogies might 
be thought to provide an argument in favour of the claim that parents ought to make 
available to their children (in some way, and at some point) such facts about their 
genealogical origins as they may have at their disposal. 
 
First, in both cases the unavailability to a child of some possible practical identities is 
conditional on a form of detachment (involving either ignorance or lack of acquaintance) 
that is not of their own making, but has been imposed on them (in some cases 
deliberately) by others. Second, the detachment in question either is, or could be, 
imposed on the child at least partly in the interest of others (such as social parents, absent 
biological parents, or anonymous and identity release gamete donors), whose interests 
will normally play a significant part in any decision about which, if any, facts to disclose, 
and how. Third, for at least some subjects of ignorance about their genealogical origins 
this ignorance results in a genuine loss of opportunities for valuable self-understanding 
and social relationships, such as a potentially meaningful relationship with a person 
involved in their conception or gestation. Fourth, although some children would clearly 
decide not to take up these opportunities if presented with them, others surely would, in 
which case the fact of their ignorance will make a substantial difference, both to their 
potential for constructing at least one kind of virtuous practical identity and to other facts 
about the course of their life. For this latter class of people, the actual conditions in which 
they are made to develop a practical identity arguably do stand as a genuine obstacle to 
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the cultivation of a practical identity that is informed by what for them either is, or would 
be, an important aspect of their self understanding.  
 
Against these considerations, the following disanalogies provide a case for the claim that 
keeping certain facts about their genealogical origins hidden from children is not 
necessarily wrong in itself, and can in some circumstances actually be the best ,or even 
the right, thing to do for parents or other carers (c.f. Appleby, Blake and Freeman, 2012). 
 
First, even if the interests of parents are in some way served by the ignorance of their 
children, it does not follow that those interests are thereby served conditionally on that 
ignorance. The two could co-exist, or be statistically related, without either one being a 
condition of the other, or anyone ever producing one in order to serve the other. By 
analogy, the fact that my father never taught me how to hunt may have been convenient 
for him given that he wanted to teach me how to fish, even if it is false (which it is) that 
he never taught me how to hunt in order to be able to teach me how to fish. Second, even 
if parental interests play a role in their decision of what to tell their children about their 
genealogical origins, only a pathological form of parenting would ignore the interests of 
the child completely. In such a case, ignorance of their genealogical origins is likely to be 
the least of the child’s problems. In general, decisions about what to tell one’s children, 
how to do so, and when, are subject to a wide range of ethically significant 
considerations, including the capacity of the child to understand and process the relevant 
information, to make meaningful use of the information in thought and action, and the 
potential for harm associated with either giving, facilitating, making available, 
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withholding, evading, manipulating, refusing, or obstructing the child’s pursuit of the 
relevant information at any given time. These are all considerations that can be 
substantially informed by what would be in the child’s best interest. It follows that one of 
the necessary conditions for false consciousness, or any other form of maladaptive 
preference formation, will fail to be met in many cases where children are kept ignorant 
of some core aspect of their genealogical origins. Third, and as already noted, it cannot be 
assumed in connection with the first line of argument considered in the previous section, 
that acquiring more knowledge of one’s genealogical origins is necessarily going to 
benefit someone, either with respect to their ability to live well, or with respect to their 
cultivation of a virtuous practical identity. And even if it is, it cannot be assumed that 
gaining access to this knowledge will necessarily be more beneficial with respect to the 
cultivation of a virtuous practical identity than either a comparative state of ignorance, or 
a state of deliberately cultivated detachment from that knowledge.  
 
Of course, if a person’s path through life is conditioned by a state of ignorance imposed 
on them by someone else, then those who have imposed that state of ignorance are taking 
an ethically significant risk, in part because the information in question could become 
available and thereby affect (either positively or negatively) the way the child relates to 
itself and to those who kept the information from them. Thus, the project of bringing up a 
child to a state of adulthood while preventing the disclosure of central facts about their 
genealogical origins (such as the identity of one or more of their biological parents) is 
one that may require the cultivation of sophisticated habits of information management, 
at least some aspects of which could be mishandled, either by themselves or by other 
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members of the relevant community, and/or subsequently be picked up on by an 
aggrieved child as a cause of anger or resentment. Incidentally, this is a kind of risk that 
would not be removed by the guaranteed provision of a facility for disclosure, such as the 
legal right granted by some states to donor conceived children to know the identity of 
their biological parents once they become adults (Draper, 2005). Being detached from 
some core aspect of one’s genealogical origins during a formative period of one’s life is 
one that could reasonably be experienced as a significant loss; even if it is a loss that 
needs to be evaluated in light of the fact that any path marked out for us by others is 
thereby a path marked out for us at the exclusion of other paths. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The extent to which not knowing one’s genealogical origins may affect someone’s ability 
to live either well or virtuously inevitably depends on features of their circumstances 
above and beyond the question of what those facts are and the intrinsic features of that 
person’s nature or personality. It also depends on how this absence of knowledge is 
embodied in the social world in which that person lives, how that knowledge relates to 
what they think of themselves as being, and what (if anything) other people do with that 
knowledge. In some cases, the relevant facts may present no obstacle to that person’s 
wellbeing or their ability to cultivate a virtuous practical identity. In other cases, such as 
those where the knowledge in question would undermine that practical identity, or where 
others have acted so as to make that person’s commitment to some of their life projects 
depend on what is essentially a false view of their place in the world, the relevant facts 
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can present obstacles both to that person’s wellbeing and their capacity to cultivate a 
virtuous practical identity. This conclusion highlights what is a basic truth about the 
contextual dependence of many of the most interesting questions about the ethical 
significance of our knowledge of the past. Although some of that significance clearly 
derives from what the relevant facts about the past are, some it also depends on what 
people either have chosen, or will choose, to do with their knowledge of those facts, and 
how they come to treat each other as a result. In light of this truth, it is only reasonable to 
be sceptical about highly general and inflexible claims concerning the rights and wrongs 
of different forms of assisted reproduction, and the informational challenges to which 
they give rise. 
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